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Abstract
This paper develops an axiomatic approach to the measurement of
social exclusion. At the individual level, social exclusion is viewed in
terms of deprivation of the person concerned with respect to diﬀerent
functionings in the society. At the aggregate level we treat social ex-
clusion as a function of individual exclusions. The class of subgroup
decomposable social exclusion measures using a set of independent ax-
ioms is identiﬁed. We then look at the problem of ranking exclusion
proﬁles by exclusion dominance principle under certain restrictions.
Finally, applications of decomposable and non-decomposable measures
suggested in the paper using European Union and Italian data are also
considered.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The subject of this paper is the measurement of social exclusion. The broad
questions that we try to address in this paper are: (i) When do we say that
an individual is socially excluded; (ii) What is the level of social exclusion
in a country? (iii) Can we say that social exclusion in country A is less than
that in country B? (iv) Given the level of social exclusion in a society, which
subgroups of the population, partitioned according to ethnic, geographic,
or any other socioeconomic characteristic, contribute more to aggregate so-
cial exclusion? (v) When can we say that one society dominates another
with respect to social exclusion and what are the consequences of such a
dominance relationship?
Broadly speaking, a person is said to be socially excluded if she/he is un-
able to ‘participate in the basic economic and social activities of the society
in which she/he lives’. In the European Commission’s Programme speciﬁ-
cation for ‘targeted socioeconomic research’, social exclusion is described as
‘disintegration and fragmentation of social relation and hence a loss of social
cohesion. For individual in particular groups, social exclusion represents a
progressive process of marginalization leading to economic deprivation and
various forms of social and cultural disadvantage’.
As Atkinson (1998) said, social exclusion is not just a consequence of
unemployment. It is true that an unemployed person may not have income
to maintain a subsistence standard of living and hence becomes socially
excluded. But many employed persons may not be satisﬁed with their work
or main activity. Expansion of employment may increase the income gap
between low-paid and high-paid workers and hence it may not reduce or
end social exclusion. Social exclusion may arise from the operations of the
market and supplies of key goods and services. For instance, people may not
be able to participate in the customary consumption activities because proﬁt
maximizing prices may exclude them from the markets. A person may not be
allowed to have an account in a bank if he does not fulﬁl certain constraints.
It can as well generate from operations of the State if the State’s social
security beneﬁt programmes are targeted towards some particular groups or
persons.
As social exclusion includes economic, social and political aspects of life,
it is a multidimensional phenomenon. It implies deprivation in a wide range
of indicators or functionings of living standards, which can be of quantitative
or qualitative type.1
1See Atkinson, Cantillon, Marlier and Nolan (2002) for a list of functionings of social
2Social exclusion is related to both inequality and poverty, but should not
be equated with either of them (Atkinson, 1998). According to Sen (1998),
social exclusion is wider than poverty. Multidimensional inequality is a mea-
sure of the dispersion of the multidimensional distribution of quantities of
consumption of the functionings for diﬀerent individuals (Tsui, 1999). Mul-
tidimensional poverty measurement speciﬁes a poverty threshold for each
functioning, looks at the shortfalls of the functioning quantities of diﬀerent
individuals from the threshold levels, and aggregates these shortfalls into an
overall magnitude of poverty (Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2002). Thus,
both multidimensional poverty and social exclusion deal with functionings
failures, while in the former we view it in terms of the shortfalls from thresh-
olds, in the latter the problem is one of inability to participate. Note further
that in the case of both multidimensional inequality and poverty the func-
tionings have to be of quantitative type, whereas social exclusion considers
qualitative type functionings as well. Social exclusion can be regarded as a
state and as a process leading to deprivation.
Atkinson (1998) argued further that it is a relative concept, we cannot
say whether a person is socially excluded or not by looking at his position
alone. The positions of the others in the society have to be taken into
account for a proper implementation of any criterion for exclusion. It has,
furthermore, a dynamic character because an individual is socially excluded
if his deprivation continues or worsens over time.
Three types of implicit conceptualization of social exclusion are currently
available in the literature. In the ﬁrst, it is interpreted as the lack of partic-
ipation in social institutions (Duﬀy, 1995, Rowntree Foundation, 1998, UK
House of Commons, 1999, Paugam and Russell, 2000); whereas the second
regards the problem as the denial or non-realization of rights of citizen-
ship (Room, 1995, Klasen 1998). Finally, the third views social exclusion
in terms of increase in distance among population groups (Akerlof, 1997).
Some researchers attempted to suggest measures of social exclusion building
on these approaches (see Bradshaw et al. 2000, Tsakloglou and Papadopou-
los, 2001). However the theoretical foundations of these measures are often
unclear.
In this paper we adopt an axiomatic approach to the measurement of
social exclusion.2 Since in order to be socially integrated a person needs to
have access to some social functionings, we ﬁrst look at the functioning fail-
ure, that is, the number of functionings from which the person is excluded.
exclusion.
2An alternative approach has been proposed by Bossert et al. (2003).
3This number may be regarded as the deprivation score of the person under
consideration. However, some of the functionings may be more important
than others. Therefore, a more general way is to assign an integer weight to
each failure depending on the importance of the functioning and the depri-
vation score of a person is the sum of these integers.
T h es o c i a le x c l u s i o nm e a s u r et h a tw ep r o p o s ei sar e a lv a l u e df u n c t i o n
of the deprivation scores of diﬀerent individuals in the society. In a sense
our approach is similar to the view that considers social exclusion as lack
of participation in social institutions, where lack of participation is treated
in terms of functioning failures. We ﬁrst characterize the family of exclu-
sion measures whose members satisfy normalization, monotonicity, subgroup
decomposability, and have nondecreasing marginals.
Normalization means that social exclusion is zero if nobody is socially
excluded. Monotonicity requires the measure to increase if the deprivation
score of a person increases.
According to subgroup decomposability, for any partitioning of the pop-
ulation with respect to some socioeconomic or demographic characteristic,
the overall social exclusion is the population share weighted average of sub-
group exclusion levels. This property enables us to calculate a particular
subgroup’s contribution to aggregate exclusion and hence to identify the sub-
groups that are more aﬄicted by exclusion and to implement anti-exclusion
policy. Clearly, according to this notion of policy recommendation, an as-
sessment of overall exclusion becomes contingent on the implicit valuation
of the exclusion measure. However, an exercise of this type may be useful
for two reasons. First, following Sen (1985), the non-welferist approach to
policy analysis is becoming quite popular. Second, in many situations pol-
icy is evaluated using speciﬁc forms of measures. So it seems worthwhile to
see what type of policy would be implied by the use of a speciﬁce x c l u s i o n
measure.
Marginal social exclusion is deﬁned as the change in social exclusion when
we increase the deprivation score of a person by one. Nondecreasingness of
marginal social exclusion ensures that in aggregating individual deprivation
scores into an overall indicator of exclusion, a higher deprivation score does
not get a lower weight than a lower score.
The characterized family of measures is shown to possess some additional
interesting properties. It is also shown that the properties employed in the
characterization exercise are independent, that is, none of these properties
implies or is implied by another.
In order to fulﬁl subgroup decomposability the weights attached to dif-
ferent functionings should be independent of the population size. However,
4an alternative assumption, which appears to be quite realistic, is depen-
dence of weights on the population size. It may also be worthwhile to study
non-subgroup decomposable measures. We therefore consider two measures
of this type, the symmetric mean exclusion of order ν > 1 and the Gini
exclusion measure, and use population size dependent weights to calculate
them.
Next, we consider the problem of ranking two societies by the social ex-
clusion dominance criterion. We demonstrate that for two societies with a
common population size and the same total deprivation score, if one dom-
inates the other by the exclusion dominance criterion, then the former be-
comes at least as socially excluded as the latter by all additive social ex-
clusion measures that satisfy anonymity and have nondecreasing marginals.
This result parallels the if part of the well-known Atkinson (1970) result on
Lorenz Domination which says that if u and v are two income distributions
of a given total over a ﬁxed population size, and if u Lorenz dominates v,
then all symmetric utilitarian social welfare functions regard u at least as
good as v, where the identical individual utility function is concave.
Finally, we apply diﬀerent measures to the EU member states in the
1990’s and consider some policy implications.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the formal
framework for measuring social exclusion and presents the properties for an
exclusion measure. In Section 3 we characterize the family of exclusion
measures and discuss its properties. Section 4 deals with social exclusion
dominance relation. The application is contained in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Properties for a measure of social exclusion
Let N (N0) be the set of all positive (nonnegative) integers and R be the set
of real numbers. For all n ∈ N, Dn is the n-fold Cartesian product of N0 and
1n is the n-coordinated vector of ones. For any society with a population of
size n ∈ N,t h e r ei saﬁnite nonempty set of functionings F relevant for social
integration. Throughout this paper we assume that F is ﬁxed so that cross
population comparisons of social exclusion can be made in terms of elements
of F.3 An individual in an n- p e r s o ns o c i e t yc a nb ee x c l u d e df r o ma n ys u b s e t
of F,w h e r en ∈ N is arbitrary. The degree of exclusion or deprivation of a
person can be captured using the number of functionings from which she/he
is excluded. For each functioning, we deﬁne a characteristic function which
3See Atkinson et al. (2002) for commonness of elements of F for the EU as a whole.
5takes on the value 1 or 0 according as the person is excluded or not from the
functioning. Since some functionings may be more important than others,
the characteristic function of each functioning is weighted by an integer,
where the integer weights are determined in terms of importance of the
functionings.4 The deprivation score of the person concerned is then given
by the sum of integer weighted characteristic functions. More precisely, let
Fi ⊆ F be the set of functionings from which person i is excluded. Denote
the weight attached to attribute j by wj, then xi =
P
j∈Fi wj.
This procedure of calculating the individual deprivation scores is quite
similar to the Basu-Foster (1998) way of determining a household literacy
proﬁle. They assumed that individual literacy is a 0-1 variable and an adult
member of a household is identiﬁed by the number 0 or 1 according as he is
illiterate or literate. The total number of literates in the household is then
simply the sum of the 1’s in the household. This procedure can as well be
extended to the situation when literacy is assumed to be multidimensional.
An exclusion proﬁle in a society of n person is a vector x =( x1,...,x n),
where xi ∈ N0 is the deprivation score of person i.W ea s s u m et h a tt h ec a l -
culation of xi involves a dynamic or longitudinal aspect.5 If xi is positive,
trade-oﬀ between excluded and non-excluded functionings is not allowed.
For instance, a person’s high income cannot compensate the dissatisfaction
associated with his job. The set of exclusion proﬁles for an n-person popu-
lation is Dn, n ≥ 1.T h u s ,x ∈ Dn for some n ∈ N. The set of all possible
exclusion proﬁles is D =
S
n∈N Dn. A measure of social exclusion is a func-
tion E : D → R. For any n ∈ N, the restriction of E on Dn is given by En.
For any n ∈ N, x ∈ Dn, En (x) is a measure of the extent to which diﬀer-
ent individuals are excluded from the activities taking place in the society,
that is, the degree of exclusion suﬀered by all individuals in the society as a
whole. For all n ∈ N, x ∈ Dn,l e tS (x) be the set of persons with positive
deprivation scores, that is S (x)={i,1 ≤ i ≤ n|xi > 0}. For any n ∈ N, x ∈
Dn,l e tq be the cardinality of S (x), that is the number of persons in S (x).
For any n ∈ N, x ∈ Dn,w ew r i t ex for nonincreasingly ordered permutation
of x,t h a ti sx1 ≥ x2 ≥ ... ≥ xn.
We assume that an arbitrary exclusion measure E : D → R should
satisfy the following postulates.
Axiom 1 : Normalization (NOM): For all n ∈ N,E n (01n)=0 .
Axiom 2 : Monotonicity (MON): For any n ∈ N, x ∈ Dn and for any i,
4See Section 5 for one approach to the calculation of weights.
5See Section 5 for details.
61 ≤ i ≤ n,
En (x) <E n (x1,...,x i−1,x i + c,xi+1,...,x n),
where c ∈ N.
Axiom 3 : Nondecreasingness of Marginal Social Exclusion (NMS): For
any n ∈ N, x ∈ Dn, and for any i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,i fxi ≥ xj then:
En (x1,...,x i−1,x i +1 ,x i+1,...,x j−1,x j,x j+1,...,x n) − En (x) ≥
En (x1,...,x i−1,x i,x i+1,...,x j−1,x j +1 ,x j+1,...,x n) − En (x).











Axiom 5 : Population Principle (POP): For all n ∈ N, x ∈ Dn, Emn (y)=
En (x), where y =
¡
x1,x 2,...,x m¢
, m ≥ 1 and each xi = x.
Axiom 6 : Anonymity (ANY): For all n ∈ N, x ∈ Dn, En (x)=En (xP),
where P is any n × n permutation matrix.6
Normalization is a miniminality principle. It says that if nobody is ex-
cluded from any functioning in the society, then the value of the social
exclusion measure is zero. Monotonicity says that if the deprivation score of
an individual increases, then social exclusion should increase. If a social ex-
clusion measure satisﬁes NOM and MON, then it will take a positive value
if at least one individual has a positive deprivation score.
Sen (1976) argued that in income poverty measurement the poverty line
can be taken as the reference point for all poor persons and the poverty gap of
a poor, his income shortfall from the poverty line, is a measure of deprivation
suﬀered by him. In order to attach higher weight to higher deprivation, Sen
assumed that the weight on individual i’s poverty gap is equal to his rank
in the income distribution of the poor. This guarantees that an increase in
poverty due to a reduction in the income (increase in deprivation) of a poor
will be higher the lower (higher) is the income (deprivation) of the poor.
Conversely, in order that an increase in poverty due to reduction in the
income of a poor is higher the lower the income of the poor is, a necessary
condition is to attach higher weight lower down the income scale. Our NMS
postulate has a similar spirit. We consider two persons where the deprivation
score of the ﬁrst is not lower than that of the second. Then the change in
6An n × n matrix is a permutation matrix if each of its entries is either zero or one,
and each of its rows and columns sums to one.
7social exclusion, if the deprivation score of the former increases by one, is at
least as large as the corresponding change when the deprivation score of the
latter increases by the same amount. It is clear that the postulates NOM
and NMS capture the idea that exclusion is a relative phenomenon.
SUD, which expresses aggregate exclusion in a society as a weighted av-
erage of subgroup exclusion levels, where the weights are population shares
of the subgroups, is very important from policy point of view. ni
n Eni ¡
xi¢
is the contribution of subgroup i to total exclusion, i.e., the amount by




100 is the percentage contribution of subgroup i to total exclu-
sion. Each of these ﬁgures is useful to planners and analysts to formulate
a n t i - e x c l u s i o np o l i c i e s .I tm a yb ei m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a ti fxi’s are depen-
dent on the population size, SUD may be violated.
POP says that if an exclusion proﬁle is replicated several times, then
the social exclusion of the original and the replicated proﬁles are the same.
Clearly, POP leads us to view exclusion in average terms. It is helpful for
cross population comparisons of exclusions.
Finally, ANY means that the exclusion measure is symmetric, i.e. any
reordering of the deprivation scores leaves the exclusion level unchanged.
ANY is unavoidable as long as the individuals are not distinguished by
anything other than deprivation scores.
3 The family of subgroup decomposable social ex-
clusion measures
In this section we derive the class of social exclusion measures whose mem-
bers satisfy NOM, MON, NMS, in addition to SUD.L e tΦ be the class of
all functions f : N0 → R such that f (0) = 0, f is increasing, and f has a
nondecreasing marginal, that is:
f (xi +1 )− f (xi) ≥ f (xj +1 )− f (xj), (1)
where xi ≥ xj.
For theorems 1 and 2 of this section we assume that the weights attached
to diﬀerent functionings are independent of the population size.
We then have:
Theorem 1 : A social exclusion measure E : D → R satisﬁes NOM, MON,







where f is a member of Φ.
Proof:















where f = E1.C l e a r l y ,f : N0 → R. MON demands increasingness of f.
Now, suppose xi ≥ xj. The inequality:
En (x1,...,x i−1,x i +1 ,x i+1,...,x j−1,x j,x j+1,...,x n) − En (x) ≥
En (x1,...,x i−1,x i,x i+1,...,x j−1,x j +1 ,x j+1,...,x n) − En (x),
on simpliﬁcation, reduces to:
f (xi +1 )− f (xi) ≥
f (xj +1 )− f (xj),
which is nondecreasingness of marginal of f.C l e a r l y ,i fxi =0for all i,t h e n
NOM requires that f (0) = 0.
Obviously, f (0) = 0 e n a b l e su st or e w r i t e 1
n
Pn




This establishes the necessity part of the theorem on Dn for a given n ∈ N.
The suﬃciency is easy to verify. Since n ∈ N was chosen arbitrarily, our
result holds for all n ∈ N. ¥
Note that the general measure in (2) satisﬁes ANY and POP although
we did not use these properties in its derivation. We can interpret f in (2) as










n is the head-count measure of social exclusion, the proportion
of persons that is socially excluded in the population. For a ﬁxed n,o n
social exclusion proﬁles with a given q, H is a constant function. Thus H is
violator of MON although it meets NOM, SUD, POP, ANY, and NMS.
The head-count measure of social exclusion is quite analogous to the
multidimensional poverty head-count ratio. Multidimensional poverty mea-
surement considers for each person a poverty indicator variable that takes
on the value of 1 if his consumption of some attribute(s) falls below the cor-
responding threshold(s). Otherwise the indicator variable assumes the value
zero. The total number of multidimensional poor is then given by the sum of
indicator variables across persons (see Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003).
In order to illustrate the general formula in (2), let f ∈ Φ be of the form









For any δ ≥ 1, En
δ satisﬁes all the postulates. For 0 < δ < 1,E n
δ is a violator
of NMS but not of others. As δ → 0,E n
δ → H. The single parameter δ in (6)
is a value judgement parameter. En
δ becomes more sensitive to the higher
deprivation scores as δ increases from 2 to plus inﬁnity. For a given x ∈ Dn,
an increase in the value of δ does not decrease En
δ .F o rδ =1 , En
δ becomes




δ =2 ,w ec a nr e w r i t eEn
δ as:
En
δ (x)=σ2 (x)+A2 (x), (7)
where σ2 is the variance of the society deprivation scores. Given A, a reduc-
tion in σ2 reduces the measure in (7). Such a situation may arise if a higher
deprivation score decreases and a lower deprivation score increases by the
same amount. Over social exclusion proﬁles with the same population size
and the same average deprivation score, the ranking of the proﬁles generated
by En
δ (for δ =2 ) is the same as that generated by σ2.
An alternative of interest arises from the speciﬁcation f (t)=eαt − 1,







(eαxi − 1). (8)
10For a given x ∈ Dn, En
α is nondecreasing in α. En
α satisﬁes all the properties
for all positive α.A sα increases, the underlying evaluation attaches more
weight to the higher deprivation scores.
We will now show that the postulates NOM, MON, NMS and SUD are
independent. By independence we mean that if one of these postulates is
dropped, then there will be measures that will satisfy the remaining postu-
lates, but not the dropped one.
Theorem 2 : The properties NOM, MON, NMS, and SUD are indepen-
dent.
Proof:




i∈S(x) exi is not normalized, but
it will fulﬁl the other properties.






1+xi is decreasing in xi,i ti s
a violator of MON, but not of the remaining postulates.





i, 0 < θ < 1, has a decreasing
marginal and hence it fails to satisfy NMS, but it veriﬁes the other properties.














i∈S(x) xi (2(n − i)+1 ) are not additive across components, they are
not subgroup decomposable. However, they are normalized, monotonic, and
have increasing marginals. ¥
The measure In
4 is the symmetric mean exclusion of order ν (>1). We can
refer to In
5 as the Gini exclusion measure since it involves a Gini type aver-
aging.7 Because of non-additivity we can calculate these two measures using
both population size dependent and independent weights. Since subgroup
decomposable measures require the latter type of weights, our calculation of
these two measures in the next section use the former weighting scheme.
It is clear that to every individual exclusion function f ∈ Φ,t h e r ec o r -
responds a diﬀerent social exclusion measure of the form (2). They will
diﬀer only in the manner how a person’s individual exclusion is speciﬁed
as a function of his deprivation score. However, there is no guarantee that
these social exclusion measures will rank exclusion proﬁles in the same way.
We consider the problem of ranking exclusion proﬁles in the next section.
7Strictly speaking, when incomes are arranged in non-increasing order, the Gini index of
inequality can be written as a linear function with weights being the odd natural numbers
in increasing order. Since the averaging in I
n
5 is quite similar in nature, we call it the Gini
social exclusion measure.
114 The social exclusion dominance relation
We begin this section by deﬁning the social exclusion dominance criterion
and look at its implications for exclusion proﬁles with a ﬁxed total over a
given population size.
For x, y ∈ Dn,w es a yt h a tx dominates y by the social exclusion relation,







for all k =1 ,2,...,n.
Given that the exclusion proﬁles x and y a r er a n k e di nn o n i n c r e a s i n g
order of functioning failures of the individuals, x ºSE y demands that the
cumulative deprivation score of the ﬁrst k persons in x is at least as large
as that in y,w h e r ek =1 ,2,...,n.
In order to study implications of the relation ºSE in terms of exclusion
measures, we now have the following:
Deﬁnition 1 : For any x ∈ Dn, we say that y is obtained from x by a
favourable composite change (FCC) if:
yi = xi − 1
yj = xj +1
yk = xk for all k 6= i,j,
(10)
where xi > xj.
An FCC, which explicitly involves relativity issue of exclusion, means
that the degree of exclusion of a more deprived person (i) is reduced by 1,
whereas that of a less deprived person (j)i si n c r e a s e db y1, so that the total
scores in the two proﬁles are the same, but the variance of the new proﬁle
(y) is less than that of the original one (x). Note that the transformation
in (10) does not alter the relative positions of the aﬀected individuals and it
reduces the deprivation score of the worse oﬀ person (i). This is the reason
why we call it an FCC.
Marshall and Olkin (1979) deﬁned a special kind of linear transformation,
called a T-transformation, of a vector that leaves all but two components of
the vector unchanged, and replaces these two components by averages. An
FCC is a T-transformation since:
yi = λxi +( 1− λ)xj
yj =( 1− λ)xi + λxj





The following theorem gives an interesting consequence of the relation
ºSE for additive exclusion measures that satisfy anonymity and have non-
decreasing marginals.









l=1 h(yl) for all individual exclusion measures
h : N0 → R whose marginals are nondecreasing.
Proof:
Muirhead (1903) showed that given x, y ∈ Dn along with
Pn
l=1 xl = Pn
l=1 yl, if x ºSE y holds, then y can be derived form x by successive
applications of a ﬁnite number of FCCs. Assume, without loss of generality,
that only one FCC aﬀecting individuals i and j,w h e r exi > xj,t a k e su s
from x to y.
Given xi > xj,l e tθ = xi −xj −1. Note that θ ∈ N0. Since the marginal
of the individual exclusion function h is nondecreasing, we have:
h(xj +1 )− h(xj) ≤ h(xj + θ +1 )− h(xj + θ), (12)
which we can rewrite as:
h(xj +1 )− h(xj) ≤ h(xi) − h(xi − 1). (13)
Inequality (13) on rearrangement gives:
h(xj +1 )+h(xi − 1) ≤ h(xi)+h(xj). (14)





+ h(yi) ≤ h(xi)+h(xj). (15)








Since the social exclusion measure
P








13which is the desired result. ¥
Theorem 3 is very valuable. It shows how an FCC becomes helpful in
ranking two exclusion proﬁles. It also provides a justiﬁcation for using NMS
as a postulate for a social exclusion measure.
In an FCC the deprivation scores of the two aﬀected persons change in
opposite directions. But often unidirectional changes in the scores of the two
or more persons may take place. The following result, whose proof can be
found in Fulkerson and Ryser (1962), states that under certain conditions
the relation x ºSE y, where the total scores in x and y are the same, is
preserved.




i=1 yi, be arbitrary. Then
x ºSE y implies that (x − ej) ºSE (y − ei),w h e r ei ≤ j and ek is the
n−coordinated vector with 1 in the kth position and zeros elsewhere.
The intuitive appeal of Theorem 4 is quite clear. Given that x dominates
y if we reduce the degree of exclusion of one person in x and one person in
y, where the latter is relatively worse oﬀ than the former, the exclusion
dominance remains preserved.
The following result, whose formal proof can be found in Fulkerson and
Ryser (1962), is a generalization of Theorem 4.




i=1 yi, be arbitrary. Let
u be obtained from x by reducing deprivation scores of persons in positions
i1,i 2,...,i k by 1. Similarly, suppose v is obtained from y by reducing depri-
vation scores of persons in positions j1,j 2,...,j k. If i1 ≤ j1,i 2 ≤ j2,...,i k ≤
jk and x ºSE y,t h e nu ºSE v.
5 An empirical illustration
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the social exclusion measures Eδ in
(6), I4, the symmetric mean exclusion of order ν,a n dI5, the Gini exclusion
measure using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) data.8
Since I4 and I5 are calculated to illustrate non-subgroup decomposability,
we calculate them here using population size dependent weights for diﬀerent





4 , and I
n
5 .
14functionings. We base our analysis on the ﬁrst six waves of ECHP, which
cover the period from 1994 to 1999. The surveys are conducted at a Euro-
pean national level. The ECHP is an ambitious eﬀo r ta tc o l l e c t i n gi n f o r m a -
tion on the living standards of the households of the EU member-states using
common deﬁnitions, information collection methods and editing procedures.
It contains detailed information on incomes, socio-economic characteristics,
housing amenities, consumer durables, social relations, employment condi-
tions, health status, subjective evaluation of well-being, etc. Of the 15 EU
member-states, we could not consider Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, and
Sweden since the data for these countries were not available for all the waves.
For similar reasons we had to exclude Germany and the UK. In particular,
the ECHP surveys of these countries were substituted by national surveys,
SOEP and BHPS respectively, that did not collect information on all the
variables considered in our application.
Information have been collected at the individual or the household level
depending on the variable, but the unit of our analysis is the individual. The
calculation uses required sample weights. In ECHP a person’s life has been
measured along the following domains: ﬁnancial diﬃculties, basic needs and
consumption, housing conditions, durables, health, social contacts and par-
ticipation, and life satisfaction. The 14 non-monetary indicators9 suggested
by Eurostat (2000) as best candidates to meet the requirements of 1) re-
ﬂecting a negative aspect of a life pattern common to a majority of the
population in the EU; 2) allowing international and intertemporal compar-
isons; 3) expressing a link with income poverty, are included in the analysis.
These are the following:
• Financial diﬃculties: 1. Proportion of persons living in households
that have great diﬃculties in making ends meet; 2. Proportion of
persons living in households that are in arrears with (re)payment of
housing and/or utility bills;
• Basic necessities: 3. Proportion of persons living in households which
cannot aﬀord meat, ﬁsh or chicken every second day; 4. Proportion of
persons living in households which cannot aﬀord to buy new clothes;
5. Proportion of persons living in households which cannot aﬀord a
week’s holiday away from home;
9In fact, the non-monetary indicators recommended in Eurostat (2000) are 15. We
decided to drop the one belonging to the health domain, namely the proportion of people
that were severely hampered in their daily activity by long-lasting health problems, since
there was a considerable discontinuity between the ECHP waves for this indicator.
15• Housing conditions: 6. Proportion of persons living in the accommo-
dation without a bath or shower; 7. Proportion of persons living in
the dwelling with damp walls, ﬂoors, foundations, etc.; 8. Proportion
of persons living in households which have a shortage of space;
• Durables: 9. Proportion of persons not having access to a car due to a
lack of ﬁnancial resources in the household; 10. Proportion of persons
not having access to a telephone due to a lack of ﬁnancial resources in
the household; 11. Proportion of persons not having access to a color
TV due to a lack of ﬁnancial resources in the household;
• Health: 12. Proportion of persons (over 16) reporting bad or very bad
health;
• Social contact: 13. Proportion of persons (over 16) who meet their
friends or relatives less often than once a month (or never);
• Dissatisfaction: 14. Proportion of persons (over 16) being dissatisﬁed
with their work or main activity.
We ﬁrst calculate Eδ for δ =0 , 1, and 2 separately for two sets of in-
dicators V1 and V2,w h e r eV 1 includes the indicators in the domains of
ﬁnancial diﬃculties, basic necessities, housing conditions, and durables, and
V2 includes the remaining indicators. The reason for separate calculations
is that for indicators covered under V1 we have household level information,
whereas for the indicators in V2 the available information are at the indi-
vidual level, with the additional constraint that the minimum age of the
reportee is 16.
W ec a l lap e r s o ns o c i a l l ye x c l u d e dw i t hr e s p e c tt oav a r i a b l ei nag i v e n
domain if he has been deprived of the variable for at least four years out of
the six years that we observe. In addition, exclusion for a functioning oc-
curs if the person concerned is deprived for the last three years. Thus, our
calculation of the individual exclusion score explicitly takes into account the
dynamic or longitudinal aspect of social exclusion. A person’s exclusion in
a given domain has been obtained by adding up his exclusions over the con-
cerned variables, that is, here the deprivation score is calculated under the
assumption that wj=1 for all j. Since in this calculation xi is independent
of the population size, SUD holds. Calculation of non-additive measures I4
and I5 involving xi’s which are dependent on the population size is presented
later in the section.
Numerical estimates of social exclusion for the EU member states are
reported in Table 1. The upper part of the table presents the estimates
16for V1 while its lower part gives the analogous values for V2. The ﬁrst
column of the table gives the names of the countries for whom required
information were available. In columns 2-4 we present, for each country,
the values of Eδ for δ =0 , 1 and 2 respectively.10 T h ec o u n t r y - w i s es o c i a l
exclusion levels are then weighted by corresponding population shares to
determine the contributions of diﬀerent countries to total exclusion, which
are given as percentages of total exclusion in columns 5-7. From policy
perspective, complete elimination of exclusion within a country would lower
aggregate exclusion precisely by the percentage by which it contributes to
total exclusion.
Several interesting features emerge from Table 1. We note that the values
of measures as well as percentage contributions are sensitive to the values
of δ. Increasingness of Eδ as δ i n c r e a s e si sc o n ﬁrmed by values of measures
shown in the table. We ﬁrst analyze the upper part of the table. Portugal
turns out to be the most socially excluded country. If we consider the ranking
of countries from high to low exclusion, then an unambiguous sequence is
Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland, France and Belgium. But there is
no unanimous agreement about the country with minimum exclusion. The
Netherlands is the country with minimum H,w h e r e a sE1 and E2 regard
Denmark as the country with minimal exclusion.
As expected, the maximum percentage contribution to total exclusion
comes from Portugal, whereas Denmark is the least contributing country.
Belgium and the Netherlands occupy respectively the second and third po-
sition in terms of low percentage contributions. The fourth column of this
part of the table shows that Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Greece, the South-
ern European countries, report 77.89% of social exclusion as judged by the
headcount index. Their contribution to overall exclusion rises to 82.68%
(86.6%) if one uses A (E2). The higher contributions of these four countries
is partly due to their almost average or more than average social exclusions.
France and Ireland come next in the ranking by percentage contributions.
A comparison between Italy and Ireland is worth noting here. Although the
latter has a better position than the former with respect to H and A,f o rt h e
other measure it becomes worse oﬀ. The reason behind is that the variance
of the deprivation scores is much higher in Ireland than in Italy. By per-
centage contributions, Ireland shows a much better picture than Italy. This
is because the country has a very low population share among the member
states.
10Recall that for δ =0and 1, Eδ becomes respectively the head-count ratio, H,a n d
the average deprivation score of the society, A.
17In V2 as well, Portugal is the member state with maximum exclusion and
percentage contribution, Italy has the second worst oﬀ position and Ireland
performs the best by showing the lowest values with respect to both the fac-
tors. Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands also show low values for both
factors. But Denmark has a better position than the other two countries by
percentage contributions, and Denmark and the Netherlands perform better
than Belgium by the other factor. However, the rankings among these three
countries in all other situations are ambiguous. For Greece we observe rel-
atively high values in both situations, and France and Spain, which do not
have unambiguous ranking between themselves, perform worse than Greece
by the either criterion. Portugal, Italy, Spain and France jointly contribute
more than 83% to total exclusion by any measure. Finally, except for Por-
tugal, the ranking of countries by any measure in V2 is diﬀerent from that
in V1.
From policy point of view, the break-down of the variables into two
subgroups enable us to identify the countries separately in each subset that
are most susceptible to exclusion.
In Table 2 we carry out a similar analysis for Italy. The country has
been divided into 11 geographic areas.11 In V1, South is the area with max-
imum exclusion by E1 and E2, while Sardegna occupies this position for H.
Similarly, there is no unanimous agreement about the area with minimum
exclusion. It is worth noting that South is only a part of the south of the
country. If we add to South the remaining southern area, namely Campa-
nia, we can conclude that the southern areas contribute between 34% and
46% to total exclusion observed in Italy, depending on the measure. We
note the diﬀerence with the northern regions, namely North-West, North-
East, Lombardia and Emilia-Romagna, whose total percentage contribution
ranges between 9% and 17%. The other two areas with high levels of ex-
clusion as well as percentage contributions are the two islands, Sicilia and
Sardegna. In the same way in V2, South is the geographic area with max-
imum exclusion, and unanimous agreement about the area with minimum
exclusion is not reached. However, the northern areas occupy low exclusion
positions without showing unambiguous ranking among themselves. More
generally, ranking of areas by any measure is diﬀerent in V1 than that in
V2.
The high contributing areas require attention from policy perspective
for reduction of their contributions so that a higher living standard can be
11The information on the geoghaphic areas of the Italian households are available in
ECHP at the Nuts 1 level.
18achieved.
In Table 3 we present results of deprivation scores using population size
dependent weights. The measures that we apply are I4, the symmetric
mean exclusion of order ν,a n dI5, the Gini exclusion measure. Here we
take into account the local dimension of the concept, i.e. people compare
themselves with their reference society, and following Runciman (1966), we
deﬁne the degree of deprivation inherent in not having access to an item as
an increasing function of the proportion of persons in the society who have
access to the item. Hence the weight attached to attribute j, wj,r e ﬂects the
percentage of the population in the country of residence of the individual
that is not deprived from that speciﬁc attribute.12 The upper part of the
table presents the estimates for V1 while its lower part gives the analogous
values for V2. In columns 2-4 we present, for each country, the values of
I4,f o rν =0 .5, 1 and 2 respectively. The parameter ν is the sensitivity
parameter, the more positive it is, the more sensitive the index will be to
the functioning failures of the more deprived. In column 5 the values of the
Gini exclusion measure, I5, are reported.
The results are strikingly diﬀerent from the analysis of Table 1 in the case
of both V1 and V2. South European countries split into two groups located
at the opposite side of the ranking with respect to I4. On the one hand,
Portugal and Greece are still the most deprived countries, while Spain and
Italy now with Denmark are the countries where social exclusion is lowest.
The latter is also the country with minimum exclusion according to the Gini
measure, and the position of Spain is unchanged as well, being the third in
the ranking from lowest to highest exclusions. When we consider relatively
high exclusions values (more than 35), starting with Greece the ranking of
countries from low to high exclusion by the Gini measure is Greece, Italy,
the Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal. Another notable diﬀerence with the
previous unweighted case is that of the Netherlands. It is now a member
state with a relatively high level of social exclusion according to all the
measures.
For V2, the domains of health, social contact and dissatisfaction, the
values of I4 are quite similar among all the countries, while we observe more
variance for I5. T h el o w e s te x c l u d e dc o u n t r yb yI4 is always Spain, followed
by Portugal when ν =0 .5 and 1, and Denmark when ν =2 . On the contrary,
Portugal is the most excluded country when disadvantage is evaluated with
12More precisely, we assume that, if the percentage of the population not deprived of
functioning j lies in the interval (10(i − 1),10i], where i =1 ,2,...,10, then wj = i. If
nobody is excluded from j, then the deﬁnition of the characteristic function ensures that
deprivation with respect to j is zero.
19the Gini measure, while France is the country with the highest level of
exclusion by I4. The Netherlands is conﬁrmed to be a member state that
occupies a low position in the scale from better to worse. The same is true
also for Italy.
Naturally, the changes we observe in ranking of countries in both V1 and
V2 in comparison with the earlier case are a consequence of assignment of
population size dependent weights to alternative functionings.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Social exclusion refers to inability of a person to participate in basic day-to-
day economic and social activities of life.
In this paper we have developed an axiomatic approach to the measure-
ment of social exclusion and identiﬁed the class of subgroup decomposable
measures of exclusion. We have also suggested a dominance criterion for
ranking two societies by symmetric additive exclusion measures under con-
stancy of population size and total deprivation score. An application of the
decomposable and non-decomposable measures considered in the paper has
been made using European Union data.
Several extensions of our analysis are possible. First, a characteriza-
tion of some class of measures, for example of Eδ, will be quite interesting.
Second, extension of our dominance criterion to the cases of nonadditive
measures, variable total and variable population size will be worthwhile. Fi-
nally, we have considered only subgroup decomposability. We can as well
consider decomposition of population exclusion by attributes and study the
impact of each of them on the aggregate exclusion. This will enable us to
identify the attributes that are more/less susceptible to social exclusion.
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V1                     
Belgium 0.208  0.340  0.873  2.66 2.00  1.54 
Denmark 0.177  0.239  0.411 1.88  1.17  0.60 
Greece 0.594  1.598  6.101  17.65  21.78  25.03 
Spain 0.510  0.906  2.222  19.15  15.61  11.53 
France 0.324  0.534  1.291  8.91  6.75  4.91 
Ireland 0.352  0.708  2.181  4.82  4.45  4.13 
Italy   0.466  0.813  2.089  18.77  15.02  11.62 
Netherlands 0.164  0.274 0.687  3.85  2.95  2.23 
Portugal 0.703  2.077  8.764  22.32  30.27  38.42 
                      
Total 0.490  1.068  3.551  100  100  100 
 
V2 
                    
Belgium 0.061  0.063  0.068  2.71 2.50  2.17 
Denmark 0.034  0.035  0.037 1.41  1.30  1.12 
Greece 0.074  0.078  0.087  8.69 8.14  7.29 
Spain 0.087  0.088  0.091  12.42  11.20  9.32 
France 0.082  0.092  0.115  10.43  10.45  10.47 
Ireland 0.022  0.023  0.025  1.21  1.12  0.96 
Italy   0.168  0.198  0.264  28.29  29.52  31.75 
Netherlands 0.032  0.034 0.039  3.05  2.92  2.72 
Portugal 0.254  0.295  0.381  31.78  32.85  34.21 
                      
Total 0.122  0.137  0.170  100  100  100 
 
V1 considers jointly the variables included in the domains of financial difficulties, basic necessities, housing conditions, durables.  
V2 considers jointly the variables included in the domains of health, social contact and dissatisfaction.  
The values reported are per persons, with the additional constraint of age being at least 16 for V2. 
    























V1                     
North West  0.202  0.314 0.639  4.06  3.62  2.86 
Lombardia 0.222  0.300  0.514  4.90  3.81  2.54 
North East  0.215  0.297  0.510  5.63  4.45  2.98 
Emilia-Romagna 0.225  0.239  0.277  2.86  1.74  0.79 
Centre 0.405  0.591  1.202  11.39  9.54  7.55 
Lazio 0.388  0.611  1.357  5.46  4.93  4.26 
Abruzzo-Molise 0.416  0.574  1.005  6.87  5.43  3.70 
Campania 0.542  1.016  2.878  12.19  13.09  14.44 
South 0.679  1.440  4.308  21.70  26.39  30.71 
Sicilia 0.665  1.243  4.025  13.49  14.47  18.23 
Sardegna 0.696 1.326  3.249  11.46  12.51  11.93 
                     
Total 0.466  0.813  2.089  100  100  100 
 
V2 
                  
North West  0.105  0.125 0.178  5.70  5.79  6.18 
Lombardia 0.090  0.107  0.150  5.53  5.66  5.92 
North East  0.098  0.112  0.143  7.02  6.84  6.53 
Emilia-Romagna 0.122  0.130  0.146  4.18  3.80  3.22 
Centre 0.164  0.188  0.241  12.42  12.15  11.70 
Lazio 0.139  0.166  0.227  5.47  5.59  5.72 
Abruzzo-Molise 0.140  0.167  0.220  6.24  6.31  6.25 
Campania 0.212  0.248  0.329  13.58  13.56  13.47 
South 0.242  0.293  0.407  21.42  22.08  23.00 
Sicilia 0.155  0.187  0.263  8.78  9.04  9.54 
Sardegna 0.204 0.227  0.280  9.66  9.17 8.48 
                    
Total 0.168  0.198  0.264  100  100  100 
 
V1 considers jointly the variables included in the domains of financial difficulties, basic necessities, housing conditions, durables.  
V2 considers jointly the variables included in the domains of health, social contact and dissatisfaction.  
The values reported are per persons, with the additional constraint of age being at least 16 for V2.     

















    
V1                       
Belgium 13.744  15.208  19.334  32.641     
Denmark 12.043  12.681  14.456  17.958     
Greece 17.358  19.608  24.216  35.383     
Spain 12.259  13.657  16.983  26.727     
France 13.393  14.704  18.218  24.216     
Ireland 16.118  18.242  23.170  57.959     
Italy   11.522  13.082  17.151  38.593     
Netherlands 15.330  16.717  20.479 43.162     
Portugal 17.004  19.774  25.249  80.245     
                        
            
 
V2 
                    
Belgium 10.293  10.361  10.568  13.333     
Denmark 10.282  10.338  10.495  12.488     
Greece 10.435  10.530  10.809  12.449     
Spain 9.261  9.293  9.391  11.777     
France 11.056  11.267  11.833  13.398     
Ireland 10.295  10.353  10.516  16.781     
Italy   10.471  10.758  11.526  18.312     
Netherlands 10.623  10.756  11.136 14.098     
Portugal 9.734  10.015  10.724  28.515     
                        
            
 
V1 considers jointly the variables included in the domains of financial difficulties, basic necessities, housing conditions, durables.  
V2 considers jointly the variables included in the domains of health, social contact and dissatisfaction.  
The values reported are per persons, with the additional constraint of age being at least 16 for V2. 
 
 